{"id":2470,"date":"2019-07-07T19:03:53","date_gmt":"2019-07-07T23:03:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/creatureandcreator.ca\/?p=2470"},"modified":"2019-08-29T21:43:19","modified_gmt":"2019-08-30T01:43:19","slug":"death-is-nothing-to-us","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/creatureandcreator.ca\/?p=2470","title":{"rendered":"\u201cDeath is Nothing to Us\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Death is inevitable. What it entails is largely unknown. Some believe that it permanently ends an individual\u2019s existence; others that it simply provides a transition to another form of life. Most people fear it, but some consider it with equanimity. Among the latter are the followers of Epicurus, who claimed <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Death is nothing to us. For what has been dissolved has no sense-experience, and what has no sense-experience is nothing to us.
(Epicurus, reported by Diogenes Laertius, translated by Inwood and Gerson, 1997, p 32; another translation is by Yonge, 1983, p. 474). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus proposed\nthat human beings are made of complex compounds of atoms. At death these\ncompounds dissolve, releasing the atoms to form other things. The body decays\nand the soul evaporates. Once we are dead, we are no more. We cannot feel what\nit is like to be dead. And the dead certainly cannot experience pain. Death should\ntherefore not be feared. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicureanism was\npopular during the Roman period. A common Latin epitaph summarized the life of\nthe Epicurean as a brief interlude between the nothingness preceding birth and\nthe nothingness following death: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Non fui, fui, non sum, non curo<\/em>
          (I was not; I was; I am not; I do not care).<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
Gustav Dor\u00e9\u2019s illustration (1857) of Dante\u2019s Sixth Circle. <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

As Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, Epicureanism faded into obscurity. Dante placed the Epicureans in the Sixth Circle of his Inferno<\/em> (1320, Canto X). Those who did not believe in the afterlife were forced to spend eternity in graves that were completely closed just as in life their tenants\u2019 obstinacy kept them from the truth. The graves were filled with fired graves just as in life the Epicureans were consumed by their heresy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the Western world\nmoved away from the dogmatism of the Middle Ages, the idea that man was not immortal\nwas once again considered. Those who now reject any belief in an afterlife sometimes\nadopt the bravado of the Epicurean epitaph. But more often than not they care\ndeeply about death as the defining event in a life. It is not nothing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Atoms and the Void<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The philosophy of\nEpicurus derives from the atomism of Democritus (460-370 BCE). Democritus was\nborn and lived in Abdera, a city in Northern Greece, at about the same time as\nSocrates was active in Athens. Democritus maintained that everything was made\nof tiny indestructible atoms (Berryman, 2016). He claimed to have learned this\nfrom Leucippus, about whom little is known, and who may be more mythical than\nreal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Democritus was called the \u201claughing philosopher\u201d to distinguish him from Heraclitus (535-475 BCE), the \u201ccrying philosopher,\u201d who believed that nothing was indestructible and that everything is forever changing. The cheerful and the tearful. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
Jusepe de Ribera\u2019s imagined portraits of Heraclitus (1615) and of Democritus (1630), both now in the Prado Museum <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Of the many\nwritings of Democritus, we now have only fragments, the most famous of which\nis    <\/p>\n\n\n\n

By convention sweet is sweet, bitter is bitter, hot is hot, cold is cold, color is color; but in truth there are only atoms and the void (translation by Will <\/span>Durant, 1939, p 393).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The concepts of\nthe atom and the void were derived from a combination of observation and logic.\nEveryone perceives that the world contains objects and that these objects move:\nmatter and motion. Objects can be broken down into smaller pieces, and these\npieces can themselves be broken down into even tinier particles. But this\nbreaking down can only proceed so far, or all objects would by now have been\nbroken down to nothing. There must therefore be some indivisible particle\nbeyond which matter cannot be further broken. These atoms (from the Greek atomos<\/em>,\nuncuttable) are so tiny that they are cannot be seen by the eye: invisible and indivisible.\nThe void is necessary to explain how things move. How could something change\nits location unless there were empty space for it to move into? <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Atoms are infinite\nin number but of a finite number of types. Moving atoms collide with one\nanother and join to form compounds. These compounds interact with each other to\ncreate all that exists in the world. Combining atoms is like forming words with\nthe letters of the alphabet. From a few letters come a myriad words. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Though atoms are\neternal, the compounds that they form are transient. Rock erodes to sand, which\nunder pressure becomes stone again. Water evaporates and then condenses. Living\nthings develop, become mature and then die. At death, the components of the\nbody break apart, releasing its atoms for making other compounds. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          Imperious Caesar, dead and turn’d to clay,<\/span>
          Might stop a hole to keep the wind away (<\/span>Hamlet<\/span><\/em>, V:1)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The soul is\ncomposed of atoms just like everything else. The atoms of the soul are extremely\nfine, perhaps similar to the atoms of fire. They permeate the body, giving it a\nconscious spirit. When the body dies, the atoms of the soul dissolve back into\nthe void like all the other atoms of the body. The soul does not persist beyond\ndeath. There is no afterlife. We are transient like everything else, mortal\nlike all other living things. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Democritus\u2019 absolute materialism differed from the philosophy of Plato, who proposed the primacy of ideas. Indeed, Plato was so upset with his rival\u2019s teachings that he reportedly urged that all the books of Democritus should be burned (Diogenes Laertius, p 393). So much for freedom of thought in a republic governed by philosophers.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Garden of Epicurus<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ideas of\nDemocritus were extended by Epicurus (341-270 BCE), who was born on the Greek\nisland of Samos off the west coast of Turkey. In 306 BCE Epicurus established a\nschool of philosophy in Athens that met in a garden below the Acropolis (Jones,\n1989; Konstan, 2018; O\u2019Keefe, 2010; Wilson, 2015). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
Epicurus (a digital reconstruction<\/a> by Bernard Frischer that combines a head from Naples with a body from Florence) <\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

He wrote extensively though none of his books survived the anti-heretical campaigns of the Christian Church. Most of what we know about Epicurus is preserved in the biography written by Diogenes Laertius (3rd<\/sup> Century CE), which includes some of the letters written by the philosopher to his colleagues, and a listing of his Principle Doctrines (Kyriai Doxai<\/em>). The philosophy of Epicurus was popular in the Roman Empire, and several statues of Epicurus have survived in Roman copies (see right). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among the lost books\nof Epicurus was the Kanon<\/em> (Rule, Criterion) which discussed how true knowledge\ncould be obtained. Epicurus proposed that sensation is the most dependable\ncriterion of truth \u2013 the world is what we perceive. Ideas derive from rather\nthan precede the analysis of sensory information. This seems to have differed\nfrom the ideas of Democritus, who believed that our perceptions were as much\nconvention as reality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the lost Peri\nPhysis<\/em> (On Nature) Epicurus presented and extended the atomism of\nDemocritus. He acknowledged that there are only atoms and the void. The body\nand the soul are made of atoms that fall apart when the corporeal body dies and\nthe conscious soul ceases. We do not live forever. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus appears to have deviated from the fixed determinism of Democritus byproposing the idea of the clinamen<\/em> (swerve). Atoms falling through the void would never collide to form compounds unless some atoms at some time swerved from their predetermined path. Democritus also suggested that this unpredictable random movement was the basis of our free will<\/a>, when we act according to what is desired of the future rather than what has been ordained by the past. In recent years similar ideas based on the uncertain behavior of atoms in the brain have been used to explain free will. Unfortunately, these ideas have little explanatory value. My actions are no more free when determined by random events in the present than when determined by the fixed events of the past. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Free will was\nimportant to Epicurus because he wished us to choose the good life. This depended\non maximizing our happiness. Although maligned by Christian polemicists as a decadent\nlibertine, Epicurus actually practiced an ascetic hedonism. He valued most the\nsimple sensory pleasures of his garden and the friendship of his colleagues. He\neschewed any participation in politics as causing too much anxiety. His goal\nwas ataraxia<\/em> (tranquility, peace of mind, from a-<\/em> not and tarasso<\/em>,\ndisturb).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although he was\ndescribed as an atheist, Epicurus thought that the gods were real because our\nideas of them were just too clear to be ignored. However, he argued that the\ngods were not in any way concerned with human affairs. Like true Epicurean, the\ngods enjoy themselves and refuse to be bothered by human politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus proposed\nthat we should not be frightened of death. Since our consciousness ceases when\nwe die, death is not painful. Since the gods are not concerned with human\nbeings, they have not provided an afterlife of punishment for all that we have\ndone wrong. If we attain a life of ataraxia<\/em>, it matters not how long we\nlive (Lesses, 2002; Mitsis, 2002). Death is the natural and inevitable end to\nlife. The following is from the Letter to Monoeceus<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Get used to\nbelieving that death is nothing to us. For all good and bad consists in\nsense-experience, and death is the privation of sense-experience. Hence, a\ncorrect knowledge of the fact that death is nothing to us makes the mortality\nof life a matter for contentment, not by adding a limitless time to life but by\nremoving the longing for immortality. For there is nothing fearful in life for\none who has grasped that there is nothing fearful in the absence of life. Thus,\nhe is a fool who says that he fears death not because it will be painful when\npresent but because it is painful when it is still to come. For that which\nwhile present causes no distress causes unnecessary pain when merely\nanticipated. So death, the most frightening of bad things, is nothing to us;\nsince when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then\nwe do not exist. (Inwood & Gerson, 1997, p 29) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus practiced\nwhat he preached. He died from an attack of kidney stones. Despite severe and\nprolonged pain, he maintained his ataraxia<\/em>. His cheerfulness of mind and\nhis memory of philosophy counterbalanced his afflictions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

De Rerum Natura<\/span><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In about 50 BCE\nTitus Lucretius Carus published a long Latin poem about the Nature of Things.<\/em>\nThe poem probably derives from the Peri Physis<\/em> of Epicurus. Little is\nknown about the poet. In his Chronicon<\/em> (circa 380 CE), written some 400\nyears later, Saint Jerome included an entry for the year 94 BCE: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Titus Lucretius,\npoet, is born. After a love-philtre had turned him mad, and he had written, in\nthe intervals of his insanity, several books which Cicero revised, he killed\nhimself by his own hand in the forty-fourth year of his age. (translation by\nSantayana, 1910, p 19)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Saint Jerome was a\ndevout Christian, completely opposed to the beliefs of Epicurus, who claimed\nthat the gods had nothing to do with human life, and who denied the immortality\nof the soul. Most critics feel that Jerome was simply trying to belittle the\npoet and to cast his work as nonsense: be not seduced by Epicureanism, since madness\nand suicide follow from such heresies (e.g., Sedley, 2018, and Smith, 1992 in\nhis introduction to the Loeb edition of De Rerum Natura<\/em>). However, the\nbiography may contain some threads of truth:   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The love-philtre in this report sounds apocryphal; and the story of the madness and suicide attributes too edifying an end to an atheist and Epicurean not to be suspected. If anything lends colour to the story it is a certain consonance which we may feel between its tragic incidents and the genius of the poet as revealed in his work, where we find a strange scorn of love, a strange vehemence, and a high melancholy. It is by no means incredible that the author of such a poem should have been at some time the slave of a pathological passion, that his vehemence and inspiration should have passed into mania, and that he should have taken his own life. (Santayana, 1910, pp 19-20).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De Rerum\nNatura<\/em> is like no other\npoem: a scientific treatise expressed in verse. The poetry is characterized by\nbrilliant language and intense imagery. Most impressive is the ongoing energy\nof the argument as Lucretius moves from atoms to death, from the soul to the\ncosmos, from the weather to the plague. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The poem begins\nwith a beautiful invocation of Venus as the mother of Aeneas, founder of Rome,\nas the patron of all the creative forces in the world, and as the\npersonification of Epicurean pleasure:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

     Life-stirring Venus, Mother of Aeneas and of Rome,
     Pleasure of men and gods, you make all things beneath the dome
     Of sliding constellations teem, you throng the fruited earth
     And the ship-freighted sea \u2014 for every species comes to birth
     Conceived through you, and rises forth and gazes on the light.
     The winds flee from you, Goddess, your arrival puts to flight
     The clouds of heaven. For you, the crafty earth contrives sweet flowers,
     For you, the oceans laugh, the skies grow peaceful after showers,
     Awash with light. (I: 1-10 Stalling translation)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

On the right is the first page of a 1483 manuscript <\/a>copy of the poem made for Pope Sixtus IV by Girolamo di Matteo de Tauris. The Latin text begins <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas,
Alma Venus, caeli subter labentia signa
Quae mare navigerum, quae terras frugiferentis<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The beginning of\nthe poem immediately questions the Epicurean view that the gods are not\ninvolved with the human world. Why should Lucretius invoke Venus as a partner\nin his poetry? The gods are a problem for Epicureanism: if they are real, they\nmust be made of atoms and, if so, they cannot be immortal; yet, if they are\nmortal, they are not gods. Lucretius probably considered the gods more as\nmetaphors than as real beings. Later in the poem (II: 646-660) he remarks that it\nis customary to call the sea Neptune, the corn Ceres and the wine Bacchus\nwithout actually meaning that these things are divine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius quickly indicates that superstitious belief in the gods can lead to terrible wrongs by recounting the story of Iphigenia, daughter of Agamemnon, who was sacrificed at Aulis to propitiate the anger of the goddess Artemis, and obtain fair winds to send the Greek ships to Troy. The illustration at the left shows a fresco in the House of Tragic Poet in Pompeii from about the same time as Lucretius. Iphigenia is carried by Achilles and Ulysses to be sacrificed by Calchas the priest, while her father on the left refuses to observe her death. Above, the goddess Artemis arranges for a stag to be substituted for Iphigenia, who will be spirited away. However, this will be done without any of the Greeks realizing that Iphigenia was not actually sacrificed. Human sacrifice is also part of the Hebrew Bible, which recounts the attempted sacrifice of Isaac in Genesis<\/em> 22<\/em> and the actual sacrifice of Jephthah\u2019s daughter in Judges<\/em> 11<\/em>. As Lucretius clearly states, Iphigenia was<\/p>\n\n\n\n

          An innocent girl betrayed to a sort of incest
          To be struck down by the piety of her father
          Who hoped in that way to get a good start for his fleet.
          That is the sort of horror religion produces.
          (I: 98-101, Sisson translation).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De Rerum\nNatura<\/em> recounts the\nprinciples of atomism espoused by Epicurus. Lucretius describes the clinamen<\/em>\nor swerve, and notes its importance for free will. We are not completely\ndetermined by our past:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Again, if all motion is always one long chain, and new motion arises out of the old in order in-variable, and if the first-beginnings do not make by swerving a beginning of motion such as to break the decrees of fate, that cause may not follow cause from infinity, whence comes this free will in living creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this will wrested from the fates by which we proceed whither pleasure leads each, swerving also our motions not at fixed times and fixed places, but just where our mind has taken us? (II: 252-260, Rouse translation).<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius considers death in many ways. The following passage provides the principal Epicurean argument:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

           So death is nothing, and matters nothing to us
           Once it is clear that the mind is mortal stuff.
           \u2026
           So when we are dead and when our body and soul
           Which together make us one, have come apart,
           Nothing can happen to us, we shall not be there,
           Nothing whatever will have the power to move us,
           Not even if earth and sea got mixed into one.
           (III: 830-1, 838-842, Sisson translation) <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius also\nadds the analogy of the mirror to the Epicurean comparison of the time before\nbirth to the time after death. If we are not concerned with what occurred\nbefore we are born, why should we be afraid of its mirror-image: the time after\nwe have died and once again do not exist:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

           Now look back: all the time that ever existed
           Before we were born, was nothing at all to us.
           It is a mirror which nature holds up for us
          To show us what it will be like after our death.
          Is it very horrible? Is there anything sad in it?
          Is it any different from sleep? It is more untroubled.
          (III: 972-977, Sisson translation)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The poem goes on\nto consider many natural phenomena. Some of the explanations that Lucretius\noffers are good, and some are similar to those proposed in modern science.\nHowever, most of the explanations are wrong. Science and poetry are not well\nsuited: poetry attempts to say things that will last forever, whereas science is\nalways changing. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the end of the\nVI Book of De Rerum Natura<\/em> Lucretius vividly describes the great Plague\nof Athens that began in 430 BCE during the Peloponnesian War. There is great\ndebate about the nature of the plague, which was perhaps caused by an\nEbola-like hemorrhagic fever.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

     The symptom first to strike was fiery fever in the head,
     And both eyes, burning hectic bright, were all shot through with red.
     The throat as well would sweat with blood, all black within. And stung
     With sores, the pathway of the voice would clog and choke. The tongue,
     Interpreter of the mind, oozed pus, and, made limp with the smart,
     Was too heavy to move, and rough. Thence the disease would start,
     Passing the gullet, to fill the chest, and flood the heavy heart
     Of the afflicted, and then, indeed, all of the gates of Life
     Began to give. From the open mouth, there would exhale a rife
     Stink, like the stench of rank unburied corpses left to rot.
     And then all of the powers of the mind and body, brought
     To the very brink of doom, began to flicker. Mental strain
     Ever danced attendance on intolerable pain;
     Pleas mingled with moans. Ceaseless retching, lasting day
     And night, was ever causing seizure and cramp, and wasting away
     The strength of men already racked with suffering and worn out.
     (VI: 1145-1161<\/span>, Stallings translation)<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Death was everywhere. Below is a detail of an engraving (from the Wellcome Library<\/a>) from a 1654 painting by Michael Sweerts, once thought to represent the plague of Athens:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
The Plague of Athens<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

The prevalence of\ndeath tore at the moral fabric of the city:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

     The present grief was overwhelming. No one any more
     Observed the rites of burial they had observed before,
     For the whole populace was thrown in disarray and cowed.
     Each mourner buried his dead just as the time and means allowed.
     Squalid Poverty and Sudden Disaster would conspire
     To drive men on to desperate deeds \u2014 so they’d place on a pyre
     Constructed by another their own loved-ones, and set fire <\/span>
     <\/span>To it with wails and lamentation. And often they would shed
     <\/span>Much blood in the struggle rather than desert their dead.
     <\/span>(VI: 1278-1286, Stallings translation)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

De Rerum\nNatura<\/em> ends here. Most\ncritics feel that Lucretius died before he could finish his poem, and that he\nprobably intended to explain how philosophy could help one face the horrors of\nsuch a plague with equanimity. But he did not. And one wonders if he could not.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stoicism <\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the time of\nEpicurus, Athens was home to several other schools of philosophy. The most\nimportant of these were the Skeptics who refused to believe in anything, and\nthe Stoics who differed from the Epicureans mainly in their promotions of\nvirtue rather than pleasure as the goal of human life (Baltzly, 2019; Long, 1986).\nThe Stoics proposed that the universe proceeded according to its own Logos, <\/em>and\nthat human benefit was not necessarily part of this determined path. One had to\naccept one\u2019s fate and do the best that one could. The Stoical idea of the Logos<\/em>\ngoes back to Heraclitus. Indeed, Stoics and Epicureans can trace their\nemotional origins to tearful Heraclitus and cheerful Democritus.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
Marcus Aurelius<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

The Stoics also differed from the Epicureans in their approach to death. While the Epicureans tried to ignore death, the Stoics paid it constant attention. Death brings one\u2019s life to an end, and therefore settles the sum of one\u2019s virtues and achievements. Life should therefore be lived as if death were imminent. The Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius, the 175 CE statue of whom is illustrated on the left, voiced these Stoical precepts in his Meditations<\/em>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man, to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to give thy self relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given to thee. <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Do not act as if thou wert going to live ten thousand years Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in thy power, be good<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

(Marcus Aurelius, 180 CE, II: 5 and III: 17, translation by Long)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stoicism became\nmore popular with the Romans than Epicureanism. And Stoicism fitted more easily\nto the doctrines of Christianity, which accepted and transformed the Stoic idea\nof Logos<\/em>, making Christ its personification.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus and Modernity<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The works of Democritus\nand Epicurus did not survive beyond Roman times. However, a manuscript of De\nRerum Natura<\/em> by Lucretius was diligently copied and re-copied by Christian monks,\nand finally discovered in a German monastery in 1417 by Poggio Bracciolini (Greenblatt, 2011). The\nfirst printed publication of De Rerum Natura<\/em> was in 1473. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The rediscovered book\nbrought the atomism of Democritus and Epicurus to the attention of the\nphilosophers and scientists of Europe. Pierre Gassendi (1592-1665) in France\nand Robert Boyle (1627-1691) in England were attracted to the explanatory power\nof atoms and developed a \u201ccorpuscular philosophy\u201d (Wilson, 2008). They tried\nbut failed to reconcile this atomism with Christian beliefs in the immortal\nsoul and a beneficent God.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
Motion of Gas Molecules<\/a><\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

As science progressed, corpuscular philosophy developed into modern chemistry. Atoms of different types combine to form molecules of various chemical compounds. The pressure of a gas depends on the force exerted by the continual movement of its molecules. This is illustrated on the right, in which five of the molecules are colored red to make their motion easier to follow. The molecules move like the motes of dust in the sunlight that were described in De Rerum Natura<\/em> (Book II:62-79). Science now knows that atoms are not indivisible, but modern science owes much to Lucretius.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As the Enlightenment\nprogressed, some thinkers decided to reject God and immortality and to accept\nEpicurus\u2019 views of death. Of these perhaps the most famous is David Hume\n(1711-1776) who, when dying of cancer, was interviewed by James Boswell\n(1740-1795). Boswell was disconcerted by Hume\u2019s refusal to believe in the\nafterlife, and by his cheerfulness in the face of death (Miller, 1995):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

I asked him if the thought of annihilation never gave him any uneasiness. He said not the least; no more than the thought that he had not been, as <\/span>Lucretius observes. (Boswell, 1776).   <\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fear of Death<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Despite the\ncheerfulness with which Epicurus and Hume faced death, Epicurean logic fails to\nconvince most human beings not to fear death. Since death before maturity\nprevents us from reproducing, evolution must clearly have given preference to\nthose whose fear of death made them avoid potentially fatal situations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus promoted\npleasure as the goal of life, but had difficulty handling its relation to time.\nCommon sense definitely presumes that pleasure is greater when it lasts longer.\nA death that shortens a potentially pleasurable life should therefore be\nfeared. Epicurus proposed that ataraxia<\/em> is the same regardless of the\nduration, but his argument is unconvincing:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Epicurus holds that pleasure is the supreme good, and yet claims that there is no greater pleasure to be had in an infinite period than in a brief and limited one. Now one who regards good as entirely a matter of virtue is entitled to say that one has a completely happy life when completely virtuous. Here it is denied that time adds anything to the supreme good. But if one believes that the happy life is constituted by pleasure, then one cannot consistently maintain that pleasure does not increase with duration, or else the same will apply to pain. Or are we to say that the longer one is in <\/span>pain the more miserable one is, but deny that duration has any bearing on the desirability of pleasure. (Cicero, 45 BCE, II: 88)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nagel (1990) makes\na similar point:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Observed from without, human beings obviously have a natural lifespan and cannot live much longer than a hundred years. A man’s sense of his own experience, on the other hand, does not embody this idea of a natural limit. His existence defines for him an essentially open-ended possible future, containing the usual mixture of goods and evils that he has found so tolerable in the past. Having been gratuitously introduced to the world by a collection of natural, historical, and social accidents, he finds himself the subject of a life, with an indeterminate and not essentially limited future. Viewed in this way, death, no matter how inevitable, is an abrupt cancellation of indefinitely extensive possible goods. Normality seems to have nothing to do with it, for the fact that we will all inevitably die in a few score years cannot by itself imply that it would not be good to live longer.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most people feel\nthat death comes before their lives have been properly completed. Some things\nhave not yet been experienced, others have not yet been atoned for; their\nachievement is not enough, their legacy not sufficient. As Cicero (44 BCE)\nremarked \u201cNo one is so old that he does not expect to live a year longer.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Makropulos Case<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

How much longer should\none then wish to live? Forever may be as frightening as tomorrow. This idea was\nconsidered in an important paper by Bernard Williams (1973) that took as its\npoint of origin a play by Karel Capek that premiered in Prague in 1922 \u2013 The\nMakropulos Case. <\/em>Leos Janacek\u2019s operatic version of the play was produced\nin Brno in 1925. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the play Emilia\nMarty, a beautiful and successful opera singer, turns out to be Elina\nMakropulos, a young Greek woman who was given an elixir of longevity by her\nphysician-father in 1601. Having lived over 300 years without aging she has\nreturned to Prague to find the elixir\u2019s formula so that she can further prolong\nher youth. The following photograph from the San Francisco Opera (2016) shows\nNadja Michael in the role of Emilia in the first act of the opera (which takes\nplace in a law office):<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n

In the end Emilia\ndecides that she does not want to live longer. She explains to the others:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

               Oh, life should not last so long!
               If you only realized how easy life is for you!
               You are so close to everything!
               For you, everything makes sense!
               For you, everything has value!
               \u2013 for the trivial chance reason
               that you are going to die soon.
               \u2026 It\u2019s all in vain
               whether you sing or keep silent \u2013
               no pleasure in being good
               no pleasure in being bad.
               No pleasure on earth,
               No pleasure in heaven.
               And one comes to learn
               that the soul has died inside one.
               (Janacek version)<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Williams (1973) agrees\nwith Emilia. After a while immortality will become tedious. Human desires are\ndesigned for shorter periods. Evolution has made us long to live longer. Yet\nthe usual span of human life gives us about the right amount of time to\nexperience what we can, and to accomplish what we should. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aubade<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another aspect of\ndeath not considered in Epicurean philosophy is that it is the end of the\n\u201cperson.\u201d Each individual spends a lifetime developing a collection of\nexperiences and achievements, out of which are derived a set of values and an\naccumulated knowledge. Warren (2004, chapter 4) considers these as the personal\n\u201cnarrative.\u201d At death the story ends. The person vanishes. Some traces will be\npreserved in the memories of others but these are but faint copies of the\noriginal. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is the reason\nwhy Lucretius\u2019 analogy of the mirror does not work. We are not concerned with\nthe time before we were born because we did not exist then. However, this is\nnot the mirror image of the time after our death when we again do not exist.\nBecause in the meantime we have existed. Time only goes one way. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Personal annihilation is perhaps the most frightening part of death. On December 23, 1977, Philip Larkin published a poem about death in the Times Literary Supplement<\/em>. (The full text is available at this link<\/a>). In a letter to a friend he called it \u201ca real infusion of Christmas cheer\u201d (Larkin, Burnett, 2012, p 495). Fletcher (2007) provides some discussion of the poem and its relation to one of John Betjeman\u2019s. An aubade is typically the dawn song of a lover as he leaves his mistress. Larkin\u2019s poem is a death song about leaving his life. He is intensely afraid: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

          The mind blanks at the glare. Not in remorse
          \u2014The good not done, the love not given, time
          Torn off unused\u2014nor wretchedly because
          An only life can take so long to climb
          Clear of its wrong beginnings, and may never;
          But at the total emptiness for ever,
          The sure extinction that we travel to
          And shall be lost in always. Not to be here,
          Not to be anywhere,
          And soon; nothing more terrible, nothing more true.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

He laments the\ninability of religious faith or philosophical reason to provide any comfort:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Religion used to try,
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 That vast moth-eaten musical brocade
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Created to pretend we never die,
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 And specious stuff that says <\/span>No rational being\u00a0<\/span><\/em>
<\/span>\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Can fear a thing it will not feel,<\/span><\/em> not seeing
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 That this is what we fear\u2014no sight, no sound,
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 No touch or taste or smell, nothing to think with,
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Nothing to love or link with,
\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 The anaesthetic from which none come round.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Larkin provides us with no resolution of this fear. In the final lines of the poem he watches as the dawn breaks and people get ready for work. Phones will ring and letters will be delivered. Communication is perhaps our only comfort. The following is Larkin\u2019s recitation of the poem. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Baltzly, D. (2019). Stoicism<\/a>. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Berryman, S. (2016). Democritus<\/a>. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Boswell, J. (1776, reprinted 1970). An account of my last interview with David Hume. In Weis C. M. and Pottle F. A. (Eds) Boswell in Extremes. 1776-1778<\/em>. New York: McGraw Hill. (pp 11-15). Also available at PhilosophyTalk<\/a> website. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Callahan,\nD. (2005). Death: \u2018The Distinguished Thing,\u2019 Hastings Center Report,<\/em> 35, S5-S8.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u010capek,\nK., (translated and introduced by Majer, P., & Porter, C., 1999). Four\nplays<\/em>. London: Methuen Drama.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cicero, M. T. (45 BCE, translated by Woolf, R., and edited by Annas, J., 2001). On Moral Ends.<\/em> Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Available at Archive.org <\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cicero, M. T. (44 BCE, translated by A. P. Peabody, 1884). Cicero de Senectute (on old age).<\/em> Little Brown, Boston. Available at Archive.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diogenes Laertius (3rd<\/sup> Century CE, translated by Yonge, C. D., 1853). The lives and opinions of eminent philosophers.<\/em> London: Henry G. Bohn.  Available at Archive.org<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Durant, W. (1939). The story of civilization: Part II: The life of Greece.<\/em> New York: Simon and Schuster. Available at Archive.org<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Edel, L. (1968). The deathbed notes of Henry James<\/a>. The Atlantic Monthly,<\/em> (June 1968)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fletcher, C. (2007). John Betjeman’s \u2018<\/em>Before the Anaesthetic<\/em>, <\/em>orA Real Fright\u2019<\/em>: A Source for Philip\nLarkin’s \u2018Aubade\u2019. Notes and Queries<\/em>, 54, 179-181<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Greenblatt, S. (2011). The swerve: How the\nworld became modern<\/em>. New York: W.W. Norton.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Inwood, B., & Gerson, L. P. (1997). Hellenistic\nphilosophy: Introductory readings<\/em>. 2nd<\/sup> Edition. Indianapolis: Hackett. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jones, H. (1989). The Epicurean tradition<\/em>.\nLondon: Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Konstan, D. (2018). Epicurus<\/a>. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Larkin, P. (edited by A. Burnett, 2012). The\ncomplete poems of Philip Larkin<\/em>. London: Faber and Faber. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lesses, G. (2002).\nHappiness, completeness, and indifference to death in Epicurean ethical theory.\nApeiron<\/em>, 35 (4), 57\u201368. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Long, A. A. (1986). Hellenistic philosophy: Stoics,\nEpicureans, Sceptics<\/em>. 2nd<\/sup> Edition\nBerkeley: University of California Press. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius, C. T. (~50BCE, translated by W. H.\nD. Rouse, 1924, with introduction and revisions by M. F. Smith, 1992). De\nrerum natura<\/em>. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical\nLibrary). (Latin with English prose translation) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius, C. T. (translated by C. H. Sisson,\n1976). De rerum natura: The poem on nature; a translation<\/em>. Manchester:\nCarcanet New Press. (Blank verse translation) <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lucretius, C. T. (translated by A.E. Stallings, 2007). The nature of things<\/em>. London: Penguin Classics. (Translation in rhyming couplets)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (180 CE, translated by G. Long, 1862). Meditations.<\/em> New York: F. M. Lupton. Available at Archive.org<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Miller, S. (1995). The death of Hume. Wilson Quarterly<\/em>, 19 (3). 30-39<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mitsis, P. (2002).\nHappiness and death in Epicurean ethics. Apeiron<\/em>, 35 (4), 41\u201355. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Nagel. T. (1970). Death. Nous<\/em>, 4,\n73-80. Reprinted in Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions <\/em>(pp 1-10)\nCambridge UK; Cambridge University Press. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

O’Keefe, T. (2010). Epicureanism<\/em>.\nDurham, UK: Acumen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Santayana, G. (1910). Three philosophical poets: Lucretius, Dante, and Goethe<\/a><\/em>. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sedley, D. (2018). Lucretius.<\/a> Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy<\/em>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Warren, J. (2004). Facing death:\nEpicurus and his critics<\/em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Williams, B. (1973). The\nMakropoulos case: Reflections on the tedium of immortality. Reprinted in his Problems\nof the Self.<\/em> (pp 82-100).  <\/em>New York: Cambridge University Press. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wilson, C. (2015). Epicureanism: a very short introduction<\/em>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wilson, C. (2008). Epicureanism at the\norigins of modernity. <\/em>Oxford: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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